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Cita de: Mad Men en Julio 28, 2015, 12:24:41 pmCita de: R.G.C.I.M. en Julio 28, 2015, 11:56:11 amA mi los que me parecen candidos son los de la democracia.Es como si creyeran en el motor de rendimiento 100%.Vamos a ver:Cuantos paises o zonas tienen un nivel de bienestar, garantias, estabilidad y oportunidad;así como transparencia, potencia, eficiencia que la UE?Les permito ejemplos de toda la galaxia. Suiza? Con 10 millones y a costa de sus bancos y el permiso de la conunidad internacional. Alguno más? Noruega? Petroleo.Van vds en un mercedes y quieren un delorean volador a basura que les lleve al futuro.No hay en el universo a fecha de hoy, isla mejor que la UE.A pesar de todos los pesares, que son muchos.Y si, eso no implica que no se pueda y deba debatir y exigir mejoras. Sds.HombreAustralia, Nueva Zelanda, Canadá, EE.UU (aunque sea criticado en este foro la gente que conozco vive muy bien), Japón, Corea del Sur e incluso Chile y alguno más. Y eso son cientos de millones de personas.Y el mundo tiende a la convergencia, cada vez será menos la diferencia. Y justamente Noruega vive del petroleo (antes era un país pobre), y Suiza es un invento de interés para estados, gente rica y poderosos. Meeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeck!!!!!!!!!!!!!Apelo a los democratas para que voten si consideran que son mejores paises Australia, Nueva Zelanda, Canadá, EE.UU (aunque sea criticado en este foro la gente que conozco vive muy bien), Japón, Corea del Sur e incluso ChileMejores, para quien?Me esta resultando Vd muy anglo, caballero, con ese facil por no llamar falsoliberalismo.No le discuto que en determinadas areas muy concretas sean mas eficientes o transparentes.Pero en un computo general, en absoluto.Japon y corea son imposibles de vivir. Con horarios de trabajo demenciales y niños desquiciados sin niñez.Nueva zelanda es una chicharrita.Canada otra.Y chile ya ni le cuento.Quiero ver como se desenvuelven esas maravillas del paradigma prtestante anglo dentro de 15 años.Todos esos paises, en cuanto US baje de escalon, veran su posicion general mermada en igual o mayor medida.Quizas a VD le parezca una maravilla singapur malasia o hong kong tambien.Lo siento, Europa rules.
Cita de: R.G.C.I.M. en Julio 28, 2015, 11:56:11 amA mi los que me parecen candidos son los de la democracia.Es como si creyeran en el motor de rendimiento 100%.Vamos a ver:Cuantos paises o zonas tienen un nivel de bienestar, garantias, estabilidad y oportunidad;así como transparencia, potencia, eficiencia que la UE?Les permito ejemplos de toda la galaxia. Suiza? Con 10 millones y a costa de sus bancos y el permiso de la conunidad internacional. Alguno más? Noruega? Petroleo.Van vds en un mercedes y quieren un delorean volador a basura que les lleve al futuro.No hay en el universo a fecha de hoy, isla mejor que la UE.A pesar de todos los pesares, que son muchos.Y si, eso no implica que no se pueda y deba debatir y exigir mejoras. Sds.HombreAustralia, Nueva Zelanda, Canadá, EE.UU (aunque sea criticado en este foro la gente que conozco vive muy bien), Japón, Corea del Sur e incluso Chile y alguno más. Y eso son cientos de millones de personas.Y el mundo tiende a la convergencia, cada vez será menos la diferencia. Y justamente Noruega vive del petroleo (antes era un país pobre), y Suiza es un invento de interés para estados, gente rica y poderosos.
A mi los que me parecen candidos son los de la democracia.Es como si creyeran en el motor de rendimiento 100%.Vamos a ver:Cuantos paises o zonas tienen un nivel de bienestar, garantias, estabilidad y oportunidad;así como transparencia, potencia, eficiencia que la UE?Les permito ejemplos de toda la galaxia. Suiza? Con 10 millones y a costa de sus bancos y el permiso de la conunidad internacional. Alguno más? Noruega? Petroleo.Van vds en un mercedes y quieren un delorean volador a basura que les lleve al futuro.No hay en el universo a fecha de hoy, isla mejor que la UE.A pesar de todos los pesares, que son muchos.Y si, eso no implica que no se pueda y deba debatir y exigir mejoras. Sds.
"Para mantener la cohesión de la unión monetaria hay que reconocer que los votantes en los países acreedores no están dispuestos a financiar a largo plazo a los países deudores", ha señalado el presidente del Consejo, Christoph M. Schmidt.
No le comprendo muyuu.El acreedor jamás de los jamases está dispuesto a RE financiar a largo plazo a su deudor una vez ya lo es.En todi caso lo hará su lo considera oportuno, una vez vuelva a convertirse en credit worthy.En serio que no entiendo la postura.
La unidad fiscal pasa porque, a largo plazo, no exista el concepto de país acreedor y país deudor dentro de la UE - especialmente en lo referente a electorados.
Cita de: R.G.C.I.M. en Julio 28, 2015, 18:17:33 pmNo le comprendo muyuu.El acreedor jamás de los jamases está dispuesto a RE financiar a largo plazo a su deudor una vez ya lo es.En todi caso lo hará su lo considera oportuno, una vez vuelva a convertirse en credit worthy.En serio que no entiendo la postura.La unidad fiscal pasa porque, a largo plazo, no exista el concepto de país acreedor y país deudor dentro de la UE - especialmente en lo referente a electorados.Salu2
ATHENS – The point of restructuring debt is to reduce the volume of new loans needed to salvage an insolvent entity. Creditors offer debt relief to get more value back and to extend as little new finance to the insolvent entity as possible.Remarkably, Greece’s creditors seem unable to appreciate this sound financial principle. Where Greek debt is concerned, a clear pattern has emerged over the past five years. It remains unbroken to this day.In 2010, Europe and the International Monetary Fund extended loans to the insolvent Greek state equal to 44% of the country’s GDP. The very mention of debt restructuring was considered inadmissible and a cause for ridiculing those of us who dared suggest its inevitability.In 2012, as the debt-to-GDP ratio skyrocketed, Greece’s private creditors were given a significant 34% haircut. At the same time, however, new loans worth 63% of GDP were added to Greece’s national debt. A few months later, in November, the Eurogroup (comprising eurozone members’ finance ministers) indicated that debt relief would be finalized by December 2014, once the 2012 program was “successfully” completed and the Greek government’s budget had attained a primary surplus (which excludes interest payments).In 2015, however, with the primary surplus achieved, Greece’s creditors refused even to discuss debt relief. For five months, negotiations remained at an impasse, culminating in the July 5 referendum in Greece, in which voters overwhelmingly rejected further austerity, and the Greek government’s subsequent surrender, formalized in the July 12 Euro Summit agreement. That agreement, which is now the blueprint for Greece’s relationship with the eurozone, perpetuates the five-year-long pattern of placing debt restructuring at the end of a sorry sequence of fiscal tightening, economic contraction, and program failure.Indeed, the sequence of the new “bailout” envisaged in the July 12 agreement predictably begins with the adoption – before the end of the month – of harsh tax measures and medium-term fiscal targets equivalent to another bout of stringent austerity. Then comes a mid-summer negotiation of another large loan, equivalent to 48% of GDP (the debt-to-GDP ratio is already above 180%). Finally, in November, at the earliest, and after the first review of the new program is completed, “the Eurogroup stands ready to consider, if necessary, possible additional measures… aiming at ensuring that gross financing needs remain at a sustainable level.”During the negotiations to which I was a party, from January 25 to July 5, I repeatedly suggested to our creditors a series of smart debt swaps. The aim was to minimize the amount of new funding required from the European Stability Mechanism and the IMF to refinance Greek debt, and to ensure that Greece would become eligible within 2015 for the European Central Bank’s asset-purchase program (quantitative easing), effectively restoring Greece’s access to capital markets. We estimated that no more than €30 billion ($33 billion, or 17% of GDP) of new, ESM-sourced financing would be required, none of which would be needed for the Greek state’s primary budget.Our proposals were not rejected. Although we had it on good authority that they were technically rigorous and legally sound, they simply were never discussed. The political will of the Eurogroup was to ignore our proposals, let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and force the Greek government to acquiesce on everything – including a massive new loan that is almost triple the size we had proposed. Once again, Greece’s creditors put the cart before the horse, by insisting that the new loan be agreed before any discussion of debt relief. As a result, the new loan deemed necessary grew inexorably, as in 2010 and 2012.Unsustainable debt is, sooner or later, written down. But the precise timing and nature of that write-down makes an enormous difference for a country’s economic prospects. And Greece is in the throes of a humanitarian crisis today because the inevitable restructuring of its debt has been used as an excuse for postponing that restructuring ad infinitum. As a high-ranking European Commission official once asked me: “Your debt will be cut come hell or high water, so why are you expending precious political capital to insist that we deliver the restructuring now?”The answer ought to have been obvious. An ex ante debt restructuring that reduces the size of any new loans and renders the debt sustainable before any reforms are implemented stands a good chance of crowding in investment, stabilizing incomes, and setting the stage for recovery. In sharp contrast, a debt write-down like Greece’s in 2012, which resulted from a program’s failure, only contributes to maintaining the downward spiral.Why do Greece’s creditors refuse to move on debt restructuring before any new loans are negotiated? And why do they prefer a much larger new loan package than necessary?The answers to these questions cannot be found by discussing sound finance, public or private, for they reside firmly in the realm of power politics. Debt is creditor power; and, as Greece has learned the hard way, unsustainable debt turns the creditor into Leviathan. Life under it is becoming nasty, brutish and, for many of my compatriots, short.
LONDON – From blaming him for the renewed collapse of the Greek economy to accusing him of illegally plotting Greece’s exit from the eurozone, it has become fashionable to disparage Yanis Varoufakis, the country’s former finance minister. While I have never met or spoken to him, I believe that he is getting a bad rap (and increasingly so). In the process, attention is being diverted away from the issues that are central to Greece’s ability to recover and prosper – whether it stays in the eurozone or decides to leave.That is why it is important to take note of the ideas that Varoufakis continues to espouse. Greeks and others may fault him for pursuing his agenda with too little politesse while in office. But the essence of that agenda was – and remains – largely correct.Following an impressive election victory by his Syriza party in January, Greece’s prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, appointed Varoufakis to lead the delicate negotiations with the country’s creditors. His mandate was to recast the relationship in two important ways: render its terms more amenable to economic growth and job creation; and restore balance and dignity to the treatment of Greece by its European partners and the International Monetary Fund.These objectives reflected Greece’s frustrating and disappointing experience under two previous bailout packages administered by “the institutions” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF). In pursuing them, Varoufakis felt empowered by the scale of Syriza’s electoral win and compelled by economic logic to press three issues that many economists believe must be addressed if sustained growth is to be restored: less and more intelligent austerity; structural reforms that better meet social objectives; and debt reduction.These issues remain as relevant today, with Varoufakis out of government, as they were when he was tirelessly advocating for them during visits to European capitals and in tense late-night negotiations in Brussels. Indeed, many observers view the agreement on a third bailout program that Greece reached with its creditors – barely a week after Varoufakis resigned – as simply more of the same. At best, the deal will bring a respite – one that is likely to prove both short and shallow.In part, the criticism of Varoufakis reflects less the substance of his proposals than the manner in which he approached his interlocutors. Eschewing the traditional duality of frank private discussions and restrained public commentary, he aggressively advocated his case openly and bluntly, and did so in an increasingly personal manner.Whether deemed naive or belligerent, this approach undeniably upset and angered European politicians. Rather than modifying a policy framework that had failed for five years to deliver on its stated objectives, they dug in their heels, eventually resorting to the economic equivalent of gunboat diplomacy. And they evidently also made it clear to Varoufakis’s boss, Tsipras, that the future of negotiations depended on him casting aside his unconventional minister – which he did, first by assigning someone else to lead the negotiations and then by appointing a new finance minister altogether.Now that he is out of office, Varoufakis is being blamed for much more than failing to adapt his approach to political reality. Some hold him responsible for the renewed collapse of the Greek economy, the unprecedented shuttering of the banking system, and the imposition of stifling capital controls. Others are calling for criminal investigations, characterizing the work he led on a Plan B (whereby Greece would introduce a new payments system either in parallel or instead of the euro) as tantamount to treason.But, love him or hate him (and, it seems, very few people who have encountered him feel indifferent), Varoufakis was never the arbiter of Greece’s fate. Yes, he should have adopted a more conciliatory style and shown greater appreciation for the norms of European negotiations; and, yes, he overestimated Greece’s bargaining power, wrongly assuming that pressing the threat of Grexit would compel his European partners to reconsider their long-entrenched positions. But, relative to the macro situation, these are minor issues.Varoufakis had no control over the economic mess that Syriza inherited when it came to power, including an unemployment rate hovering around 25% and youth joblessness that had been running at more than 50% for a considerable period. He could not influence in any meaningful manner the national narratives that had sunk deep roots in other European countries and thus undermined those countries’ ability to adapt. He could not counter the view among some of the region’s politicians that success for Syriza would embolden and strengthen other non-traditional parties around Europe.It also would have been irresponsible for Varoufakis not to work behind closed doors on a Plan B. After all, Greece’s eurozone destiny largely was – and remains – in the hands of others (particularly Germany, the ECB, and the IMF). And it is yet to be established whether Varoufakis broke any laws in the way he and his colleagues worked on their contingency plan.When push came to shove, Varoufakis faced the difficult choice of going along with more of the same, despite knowing that it would fail, or trying to pivot to a new approach. He bravely opted for the latter. While his brash style undermined outcomes, it would be a real tragedy to lose sight of his arguments (which have been made by many others as well).If Greece is to have any realistic chance of long-term economic recovery and meeting its citizens’ legitimate aspirations, policymakers must recast the country’s austerity program, couple pro-growth reforms with greater social justice, and secure additional debt relief. And if Greece is to remain in the eurozone (still a big if, even after the latest agreement), it must not only earn its peers’ respect; it must be treated with greater respect by them as well.
European 'alliance of national liberation fronts' emerges to avenge Greek defeatFor the pony-tailed leader of Spain's Podemos movement, the Leninist lesson of Greece is that revolutionary forces must show an iron fist