El avispero de oriente

[Currobena]

Buenas noticias, para variar. Los kurdos derrotan a ISIS y salvan de una muerte segura a miles de cristianos sirios.

You’ve probably heard by now that the Syrian Kurds have taken Tal Abyad, the key border town due north of Islamic State’s capital, Raqqa.
It’s a huge loss for Islamic State, and a big boost for the Kurds. But it’s something more than that: a glorious victory. That’s not something I get to write very often.
Most war stories are the dead opposite of glorious. You start out, as a war-nerdy kid, believing that Gettysburg is the norm—a good clean fight between brave, simple soldiers, ferocious against each other but sparing non-combatants. There was exactly one civilian death at Gettysburg, and that was from a stray bullet.
Then you get serious about warfare and realize that massacre is the norm, genocide is more common than anyone wants to realize, and most conflicts are bad vs. bad, or bad vs. even worse.
But not this time. The war between the Syrian Kurds and Islamic State is as close to good vs. evil as you’ll ever meet in the grown-up world. The YPG/J are radical feminists, with women fighting on the front lines and even commanding whole fronts; Islamic State takes misogyny to a new level, actually boasting in their glossy magazine Dabiq about the righteousness of selling captured women as sex slaves.
I’d be wary of believing that the YPG/J are as good as they seem, except that I lived among Kurds. They really are heroic people. No doubt there are bad Kurds, and there have certainly been evil things done by Kurdish people, like serving as enforcers for the Turks during the Armenian Genocide.
But Kurds are working very hard, and fighting heroically, to change themselves and their world; for starters, they’re still the only participants in the Armenian Genocide who’ve acknowledged their role. And the rate of social change, especially in the role of women, in Kurdish culture is approaching light speed.
Islamic State, meanwhile, represents the most extreme reactionary position in the Middle East. Even the way the latest campaign between Islamic State and the YPG/J developed shows just how friggin’ evil Islamic State is. After being humiliated at Kobane, IS’s leaders wanted a cheap, quick victory to erase the shameful memory. After all, those Qatari, Saudi, and Kuwaiti billionaires aren’t going to keep funding your jihad if you keep getting shown up, especially when it’s mere women doing the showing-up.
So IS decided to do what it does best: Wipe out a minority sect. And they chose the Assyrian Christian villages that cluster to the west of the provincial capital, Hasakah, as a perfect target. The Assyrians have been targeted in sectarian pogroms for centuries; they’re a peaceful, quiet people, just like the Yazidii minority that IS destroyed in Iraq. Just the kind of kaffirs that IS loves to massacre and enslave.
IS fled Kobane at the end of January 2015, and by the end of February, IS had shifted men and weapons to the front west of Hasakah, planning to overrun the strip of Assyrian-Christian villages along the Khabour River. (By the way, if you want to see what happened via carefully sequenced battle-maps, go to the excellent site “Agathocle de Syracuse” and click on “Hasakah Western Front.”)
The geography is a little complicated here. As you can see on this excellent map (also courtesy of “Agothocle de Syracuse”), the Syrian Kurds control three enclaves or “cantons,” all along the Turkish border: Afrin in the northwest, up against Hatay Province (Hatay is a story in itself, one I’ve written about before); Kobane in the center; and Hasakah in the east. Hasakah is the biggest Kurdish enclave, and the most important, since it joins the KRG region controlled by the Iraqi Kurds. Those Iraqi Kurds are much more conservative than the young women and men of the YPG/J, but there’s still some solidarity there, and some quiet resupply going on.
Islamic State holds the center of the country, along the Euphrates River, and the border area due west of Iraq’s Nineveh Province, south of the Kurdish enclave in Hasakah. So, by attacking along the Khabour, IS was punching up, like a good leftist (bitter Hebdo joke; never mind)—that is, attacking due north.
IS is media-savvy as all Hell; it runs on victory videos. A campaign against a helpless minority like the Assyrians would mean lots of good video, plenty of loot, and thousands of new slave girls to sell.
They might even have thought that the Kurds of the YPG/J wouldn’t fight too hard to defend mere non-Kurdish, non-Muslim neighbors. Few communities in that part of the world put themselves at risk to help neighbors of a different ethnic group or religion.
But the Kurds…I’m telling you, the Kurds are something special. I saw it myself. In Suli, my students would say, “I have Christian (Assyrian) friends!” or “I have Shia (Arab, refugee from Southern Iraq) friends!”
When I told people back in America about those remarks, they had a hard time seeing anything very radical or impressive about them. People shrugged, as if it was banal or fake.
It’s hard to get some people to realize that not every place is America. In Iraq, calling someone from a different sect/ethnic group a “friend” is heroic. And not something you see, in other parts of the Middle East.
The Kurds are trying very hard to change, to get out of the sectarian nightmare. So when Islamic State attacked those vulnerable Assyrian villages around the town of Tal Hamer, they fought for the Assyrians.
It must have been a surprise for the sectarian scum of IS. People like that tend to judge everyone by themselves. And the history around there is pretty grimly sectarian, right down the centuries. “Tal,” the first word of most town names in the region, means “man-made hill,” or “old fort.” (“Tel Aviv” comes from the same Semitic root.) You build your town on a defensive mound, and you kill your neighbors of the wrong language/religion when you can.
Not the Kurds, though. Not this time. They fought for the Assyrians, and helped the “fledging” (i.e. “pretty well useless”) Assyrian militias. Assyrian civilians had been evacuated to the provincial capital in advance, so IS captured few women to sell or men to behead. They had to settle for blowing up the church in the Assyrian village of Tal Nasri (“hill-mound of the Christians”).
IS advanced slowly through March and April, and almost had the town of Tal Tamer cut off. The YPG/J allowed the bulge to develop, then hit back hard at the beginning of May 2015, slicing in from the northwest, cutting IS’s main supply line and leaving hundreds of IS isolated in a pocket around Tal Tamer.
I haven’t been able to find out what happened to those IS fighters in the pocket, but it’s a fair bet that their beards have finally stopped growing.
By attacking the Assyrian villages along the Khabour, IS had let its sectarian hatred blind it to basic strategic rules. Islamic State’s top priority should have been to defend and extend its link to Turkey, which runs north from Raqqa through Tal Abyad via Highway 6, and prevent the Syrian Kurds from linking up their “cantons” along the Syrian/Turkish border. If Schlieffen had been an Islamic State strategist, he would’ve said, “Keep the northeastern front strong” on his deathbed.
Instead, Islamic State had shifted men and vehicles south, to the Tal Tamer front, leaving the northern flank, along the Turkish border, weakened.
And that’s how the YPG/J was able to take Tal Abyad this week. Once IS’s attack to the south was contained, YPG/J rolled west along the border zone relatively easily. IS has a rep for fighting to the death, but they seem to have lost the will to fight lately, especially when up against YPG/J.
And thanks to their earlier victory in Kobane, YPG/J was able to close in on Tal Abyad from the west, at the same time as its Hasakah forces were advancing along the border from the east. Kobane may have vanished from the headlines, but the young women and men who liberated it never stopped fighting, advancing west, south, and east from Kobane.
With Kurdish forces pushing east along the border from Kobane and west from Hasakah, Islamic State was barely holding on to a Polish-Corridor style strip of territory around Tal Abyad, by the end of May 2015.
On June 11, YPG/J and its FSA allies overran the town of Suluk, a few kilometers southeast of Tal Abyad. By this point, Islamic State was acting like a defeated force, blowing up bridges to stall the advance of YPG/J and trying to corral fleeing civilians back into Tal Abyad.
And yesterday, June 15, 2015, a day that will live in the opposite of infamy (“famy”?), the YPG/J took full control of Tal Abyad, finally uniting the Kurdish enclaves of Kobane and Hasakah (“Jazira”) and destroying the jihadi corridor from Turkey to Raqqa.
Now, IS will have a much harder time keeping the flow of gullible cannon fodder coming in from Turkey.
All the right people are cheering, and all the wrong ones are crying, from Erdogan’s hick reactionaries in Ankara to the fat money men in the Gulf. This is the rarest thing in all of warfare, a truly glorious victory. The good guys do win, now and then.

http://pando.com/2015/06/17/the-war-nerd-a-glorious-victory-for-once/

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/islam-extremism-scholars-sayyid-qutb-by-daniel-chirot-and-scott-l--montgomery-2015-07/spanish

SEATTLE – En 1877, el gran novelista francés Víctor Hugo escribió: "Se puede resistir a la invasión de un ejército, pero no se puede resistir a la invasión de las ideas". Hoy en día, el poder de las ideas, para bien o para mal, es algo que debemos tener en cuenta, especialmente al contemplar el radicalismo islámico. Los recientes ataques terroristas en Francia, Kuwait y Túnez son sólo los últimos recordatorios de lo importante que es entender que, detrás de estas atrocidades, existen ideas serias, no simplemente criminales furiosos y frustrados.

Los movimientos jihadistas islámicos violentos no plantean un peligro existencial para Europa o Norteamérica. Ocasionalmente pueden perpetrar actos terroristas mortales, pero no tienen ninguna posibilidad de destruir o apropiarse de las sociedades occidentales. Los intentos motivados por el pánico de ingresar en países musulmanes y extirpar la amenaza han sido contraproducentes y sólo sirvieron para aumentar el poder de atracción del extremismo islámico.

La mayoría de los musulmanes rechazan las versiones más duras del Islam, pero muchos -si no la mayoría- sienten empatía por la idea de luchar contra los dictados de Occidente y regresar a la fe de sus fuerzas y glorias pasadas. Sería un error afirmar que sólo una pequeña minoría de musulmanes respaldan las acciones de los extremistas o que facciones fundamentalistas se han adueñado de una religión a la que no representan en absoluto. Los radicales islámicos gozan de suficiente respaldo como para ser una amenaza seria en su parte del mundo. Es importante entender cómo sucedió esto.

Las teologías islámicas duras y radicalmente conservadoras han existido casi desde la muerte del profeta Mahoma en el año 632, pero han sido reiteradamente refutadas por escuelas de pensamiento musulmán más tolerantes y moderadas. Como las Biblias cristiana y judía, el Corán está abierto a la interpretación, ya sea completamente liberal como dogmática y represiva.

A fines del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX, muchos pensadores musulmanes -el más conocido Jamal al-Din al-Afghani- creían que abrazar muchos de los ideales desarrollados en Occidente durante el Iluminismo era la única manera de promover el progreso. Al-Afghani y otros escribieron que el rechazo por parte del Islam de la ciencia y el progreso occidentales era una mala interpretación del Corán.

Pero a medida que transcurrió el siglo XX, los reformistas musulmanes perdieron terreno a manos de los nacionalistas seculares que recalcaban que el socialismo era el camino a la modernización. La promesa del secularismo, sin embargo, no prosperó y países como Egipto, Libia, Irak y Siria se hundieron en el despotismo y la corrupción. Esto sirvió de terreno fértil para las versiones antioccidentales, reaccionarias y violentas del Islam.

Estas tensiones tienen muchas raíces intelectuales. Pero quizá la única fuente moderna más importante sean los escritos del académico egipcio Sayyid Qutb. Junto con otros fundamentalistas, como el filósofo paquistaní Abul A'la Maududi, Qutb sostenía que el verdadero Islam había sido infiltrado y corrompido por ideas externas. Sólo cuando fuera recuperado se revertirían dos siglos de humillación a manos de las potencias imperiales occidentales y, más recientemente, del estado naciente de Israel. Dios se pondría una vez más de parte de los musulmanes contra sus enemigos, a quienes Qutb llamó "cruzados y judíos".

Dictaduras en el norte de África y Oriente Medio intentaron reprimir a los conservadores islámicos. Pero Arabia Saudita -un bastión del conservadurismo- utilizó su riqueza petrolera para contrarrestar a los modernizadores seculares y a cualquier tipo de Islam reformado, financiando a misionarios fundamentalistas y mezquitas conservadoras en todo el mundo islámico. Qutb fue ejecutado por el dictador egipcio Gamal Abdel Nasser en 1966 como parte de un intento brutal pero infructuoso de eliminar a la Hermandad Musulmana.

Por cierto, las medidas severas no hicieron más que fortalecer a los islamistas conservadores, cuya fe los ayudó a sobrevivir a la represión. Y sirvieron para convencer a los musulmanes jóvenes y descontentos de que el extremismo era la única solución posible para la debilidad y la falta de oportunidades de sus sociedades.
Confrontar las ideas con medios militares es un camino seguro a la derrota. Cuando las potencias occidentales envían soldados a los países musulmanes, intentan someter a los extremistas con bombardeos, apoyan a dictaduras brutales o respaldan ciegamente cualquier política israelí, confirman los reclamos de los islamistas radicales y mandan nuevos adherentes a sus filas.

El verdadero campo de batalla reside en el terreno de las ideas. En lugar de reacciones armadas excesivas motivadas por el pánico, lo que se necesitan son intercambios culturales. Hay muchos intelectuales serios en las sociedades islámicas que quieren revivir el llamado reformista para abrazar algunas de las ideas del Iluminismo occidental: el valor de la ciencia, la importancia de la tolerancia liberal y la necesidad de una discusión libre y abierta. Los académicos occidentales que entienden el Islam y hablan algunas de las muchas lenguas de quienes lo practican tienen que respaldar a estos movimientos intelectuales.

Los halcones en Occidente pueden intentar descartar acciones como éstas por considerarlas débiles. Pero si bien pueden servir de poco en el corto plazo, seguramente resultarán críticas en el largo plazo. Después de todo, la fuerza que derribó al comunismo en Europa -una ideología mucho más peligrosa que el Islam radical- no fue simplemente la contención militar, sino también el poder de las ideas y los ideales.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

No To Warmongering

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-08-31/russian-military-forces-arrive-syria-set-forward-operating-base-near-damascus

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-09-02/former-cia-boss-and-4-star-general-us-should-arm-al-qaeda

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-09-03/europes-refugee-crisis-out-control-hungary-pm-rages-german-problem-not-eu-problem#comment-6508134

Quit drinking the kool aid. Saddam, Qaddafi, Assad, and Mubarak were tough leaders holding together peaceful secular countries. Countries that had womens rights and women in high positions plus no Al Qaeda or ISIS. If these guys were so brutal why were the incarceration rates per hundred thousand, before the US and it's regime change agenda showed up, a tiny fraction of that bastion of freedom USA? The propaganda of imminent massacres was all propaganda to justify regime change by the US and it's puppets. Real citizens of those countries would tell you if you weren't a danger to the government they left you alone.

The initial cause of the Arab Spring was the IMF and it's draconian dictates. No more subsidies for food and fuel, which comprised a large part of the income of the majority of people in Egypt and Syria, along with having to sell off government owned industries which they sold to cronies.

The US took advantage of that unrest to throw Mubarak under the bus and pave the way for the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria the US and Saudi Arabia infiltrated jihadis and weapons from Libya, the real reason Ambassador Stevens and the large contingent of CIA were in Benghazi, to take advantage of the protests to initiate regime change. It has been proven that the vast majority of rebels in Syria are foreign jihadis. Putin is laughing his ass off as trouble in his Muslim republics is down huge as the jihadis head to Syria. Libya was the most properous country in Africa and employed thousands of would be boat people who sent money home that created more jobs and stability.

Libya invested heavily in Africa directly or the through the Libyan development fund creating even more jobs and prosperity. All of that is gone. With the help of "liberated" Libyan weapons Al Qaeda in Africa, and the Sinai, has gone from a nothing to hyper growth mode. Then we have US drones killing thousands of innocent people in at least 10 countries and now the Saudi's using Yemeni civilians, who are dying by the thousands, for target practice with their recent invasion that the US has never condemned. We have the dictator Bashar in Sudan who is a true brutal dictator that makes Saddam, Assad, Qaddafi, and Mubarak look like choir boys and is propped up by the US. Near the end of the Libyan war he invaded southern Libya to secure the oil fields as a favor to the Europeans. Here's a guy wanted by the World Court who travels freely with no fear of being arrested.

This is the real story not that crapola Obama and his lapdog press have been feeding you. That's why the refugees claim they have a right to be in Europe because it's the US and it's European minions that destroyed their countries and economies.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-09-05/putin-confirms-scope-russian-military-role-syria

[saturno]

En una imagen



http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-09-05/putin-confirms-scope-russian-military-role-syria

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

https://consortiumnews.com/2015/09/04/in-bed-with-the-reactionary-saudis/

The U.S.-Saudi alliance is no longer just an anachronism. It has become a dangerous anachronism with the Saudis implicating the United States in their brutal sectarian conflicts, such as the wars in Yemen and Syria, and in their reactionary human rights policies, as ex-CIA analyst Paul R. Pillar explains.

By Paul R. Pillar

Saudi King Salman visits Washington amid disagreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia on a broad range of issues. Moreover, the disagreements are rooted in fundamental characteristics of the anachronistic Saudi regime.

Many regimes around the world, and the political and social systems of which they are a part, are markedly different from what is found in the United States, but the Saudi polity is one of the most different. The anachronism that is Saudi Arabia represents a major problem for U.S. foreign policy, both because of the impact Saudi-related matters have on the Middle East and beyond and because of the close association between Saudi Arabia and the United States that has come to be taken for granted.

Little of this has anything to do with the just-completed agreement to restrict Iran’s nuclear program, despite the attention that subject has been receiving. Riyadh is more likely to accept the agreement as a done deal — and already has publicly indicated its formal acceptance — than the accord’s opponents in the United States and Israel.

The Saudis will continue to look for ways to discourage others, including the United States, from developing warm relations with their rival across the Persian Gulf, but this will not preclude the Saudis themselves, along with the other Gulf Arabs, from undertaking their own rapprochement with Tehran, just as they have done in the past.

In hot spot after hot spot in the Middle East, U.S. and Saudi objectives and priorities diverge, even if in some loose sense they are considered to be on the same side. In war-torn Syria, the United States and Saudi Arabia have never agreed on whether the ouster of the Assad regime or the containment of ISIS should be the main objective.

Saudi priorities are based on a variety of considerations that are specific to it and not to the United States, including hatred of the Assads for whatever role they may have played in the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri, a special friend of the Saudis. Reflecting the different priorities and objectives is disagreement over selection and vetting of Syrian rebels to be deemed worthy of support.

In Iraq, Saudi priorities are influenced by some of the same sectarian motives that shape Saudi policy toward Syria. And again, such motives are quite different from U.S. interests. Desired overthrow of the regime is not the factor that it is in Syria, but distrust of the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad is a major part of the Saudi approach toward Iraq.

In Yemen, the United States has allowed itself to become associated with a destructive and misguided Saudi military expedition, and thus also with the humanitarian tragedy that the operation has entailed. The main Saudi objective is to show who’s boss on the Arabian Peninsula, another objective not shared with the United States. Saudi Arabia’s operation has shown itself, more so than Iran, to be a destabilizing force intent on throwing its weight around in the neighborhood.

In his most recent column Tom Friedman identifies what may be the most worrisome thing about Saudi Arabia for U.S. interests: “the billions and billions of dollars the Saudis have invested since the 1970s into wiping out the pluralism of Islam — the Sufi, moderate Sunni and Shiite versions — and imposing in its place the puritanical, anti-modern, anti-women, anti-Western, anti-pluralistic Wahhabi Salafist brand of Islam promoted by the Saudi religious establishment.”

Friedman notes that Islamist extremist groups that the United States has come to consider preeminent security concerns, including Al Qaeda and now ISIS, “are the ideological offspring of the Wahhabism injected by Saudi Arabia into mosques and madrasas from Morocco to Pakistan to Indonesia.”

The specific terrorist consequences of what the Saudis have done is justifiably an immediate concern for U.S. policy-makers. But the underlying bargain that Ibn Saud, the founder of the current Saudi kingdom, reached years ago with the Wahhabis also underlies much else that makes Saudi Arabia what it is today, and makes it the problem that it is. The kingdom’s troublesome characteristics are inextricably linked to how Ibn Saud’s offspring are trying to claim legitimacy and thus to cling to power.

Consider some of the chief characteristics of the kingdom. Saudi Arabia is a family-run enterprise in which the distribution and exercise of political power are every bit as medieval as they ever were in any country ruled by the Plantagenets. There is no religious freedom. Human rights in many other respects are sorely lacking. Women are still subordinated. It was considered a big deal when they recently were told they could vote and run as candidates — in elections to local councils with scant power and in which the king will still appoint half the members — but women still cannot function as independent persons in many aspects of daily life. They still are not allowed to drive.

It ought to be astounding that a place this far removed from the liberal democratic values with which the United States likes to be associated, even without considering the aforementioned divergence of objectives elsewhere in the region, still is considered a close partner of the United States. The usual, and to a large degree valid, explanation is that, as Friedman puts it, “we’re addicted to their oil and addicts never tell the truth to their pushers.”

But there is another American attitude involved, which persists even in the shale-fracking era. Once a nation is considered a partner or ally in a region that is perceptually divided into allies and adversaries, the perceived line-up tends to stay fixed until and unless there is a political alteration sufficiently great to be labeled regime change.

And regime change would be the most troubling chapter of all in the Saudi story. Some Saudi leaders, including the late King Abdullah, seem to have recognized the need to move in the direction of modernization and liberalization, even if only at the glacial pace that is possible in a Wahhabi-committed family enterprise.

It is an open question whether the regime will be able to keep this kind of change ahead of demands for change of a more drastic and radical sort. If it fails to do so, and the revolution comes, then the association of the United States with the ancien régime will an even greater problem for U.S. policy-makers than what they face now.

[sudden and sharp]

Lo mejor: la foto.



Las mujeres americanas no se ponen velo en suelo saudí, porque son libres y...

porque pueden.




[ Bien por los yankees!  ]

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

¡Esto sí que es una Alianza de Civilizaciones! 

[Currobena]

Un supuesto documento desclasificado de la CIA en el que explica la estrategia de los Estados Unidos a través de ISIS. La clave es la lucha por Siria entre Rusia y los Estados Unidos.

[url=https://www.scribd.com/embeds/268764979/content]https://www.scribd.com/embeds/268764979/content[/url]

Más información aquí

the Obama administration evidently green-lighted were Turkish air strikes not against IS militants but their own Kurdish rebels with whom they had a fragile truce and who are linked to just about the only effective force the U.S. has found to fight IS, Syrian Kurds. In other words, an additional element of chaos was introduced to the region. As one wag put it, by attacking the Kurds, the Turks provided the Islamic State with something it previously lacked: an air force. To add insult to injury: according to McClatchy, Turkish intelligence tipped off the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front that the U.S. was about to insert in Syria a tiny group of 54 “moderate” Syrians the Pentagon had vetted from 7,000 applicants and spent a fortune training. Al-Nusra’s fighters essentially wiped the unit out on the spot. Talk about a cornucopia of failure!

http://www.unz.com/tengelhardt/nick-turse-nothing-succeeds-like-failure/#comment-1127783

[Lego]

Esto parece importante, si se confirma.

Irak anuncia una alianza militar con Rusia, Irán y Siria para luchar contra el ISIS.

Iraq says Russia, Iran, Syria cooperating on security issues in Baghdad

(click to show/hide)

Iraq said on Saturday that its military officials were engaged in intelligence and security cooperation in Baghdad with Russia, Iran and Syria to counter the threat from the Islamic State militant group, a pact that could raise concerns in Washington.

A statement from the Iraqi military's joint operations command said the cooperation had come "with increased Russian concern about the presence of thousands of terrorists from Russia undertaking criminal acts with Daesh (Islamic State)."

The move could give Moscow more sway in the Middle East. It has stepped up its military involvement in Syria in recent weeks while pressing for Damascus to be included in international efforts to fight Islamic State, a demand Washington rejects.

Moscow's involvement in Iraq could mean increased competition for Washington from a Cold War enemy as long-time enemy Iran increases its influence through Shi'ite militia allies just four years after the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

By raising the stakes in Syria's four-year-old civil war, Russia has prompted its Cold War foe to expand diplomatic channels with it.

Western officials have said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry wants to launch a new effort at the U.N. General Assembly this week to try to find a political solution to the Syrian conflict.

Diplomacy has taken on new urgency in light of Russia's military build-up in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and a refugee crisis that has spilled into Europe.

Critics have urged U.S. President Barack Obama to be more decisive in the Middle East, particularly towards the Syrian conflict, and say lack of a clear American policy has given Islamic State opportunities to expand.

Russian news agency Interfax quoted a military diplomatic source in Moscow as saying the Baghdad coordination centre would be led on a rotating basis by officers of the four countries, starting with Iraq.

The source added a committee might be created in Baghdad to plan military operations and control armed forces units in the fight against Islamic State.

A Russian foreign ministry official told Interfax on Friday that Moscow could "theoretically" join the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State if Damascus were included in international efforts to combat Islamic State and any international military operation in Syria had a United Nations mandate.

Iraqi officials on Friday had denied reports of a coordination cell in Baghdad set up by Russian, Syrian and Iranian military commanders aimed at working with Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

The armed groups, some of which have fought alongside troops loyal to Assad, are seen as a critical weapon in Baghdad's battle against the radical Sunni militants of Islamic State.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari said in New York on Friday that his country had not received any Russian military advisers to help its forces but called for the U.S.-led coalition to bomb more Islamic State targets in Iraq.

Despite more than $20 billion in U.S. aid and training, Iraq's army has nearly collapsed twice in the last year in the face of advances by Islamic State, which controls large swathes of territory in the north and west of the OPEC oil producer.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/26/uk-mideast-crisis-iraq-russia-idUKKCN0RQ0S420150926

[wanderer]

Esto parece importante, si se confirma.

Irak anuncia una alianza militar con Rusia, Irán y Siria para luchar contra el ISIS.

(click to show/hide)

Iraq says Russia, Iran, Syria cooperating on security issues in Baghdad

(click to show/hide)

Iraq said on Saturday that its military officials were engaged in intelligence and security cooperation in Baghdad with Russia, Iran and Syria to counter the threat from the Islamic State militant group, a pact that could raise concerns in Washington.

A statement from the Iraqi military's joint operations command said the cooperation had come "with increased Russian concern about the presence of thousands of terrorists from Russia undertaking criminal acts with Daesh (Islamic State)."

The move could give Moscow more sway in the Middle East. It has stepped up its military involvement in Syria in recent weeks while pressing for Damascus to be included in international efforts to fight Islamic State, a demand Washington rejects.

Moscow's involvement in Iraq could mean increased competition for Washington from a Cold War enemy as long-time enemy Iran increases its influence through Shi'ite militia allies just four years after the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

By raising the stakes in Syria's four-year-old civil war, Russia has prompted its Cold War foe to expand diplomatic channels with it.

Western officials have said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry wants to launch a new effort at the U.N. General Assembly this week to try to find a political solution to the Syrian conflict.

Diplomacy has taken on new urgency in light of Russia's military build-up in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and a refugee crisis that has spilled into Europe.

Critics have urged U.S. President Barack Obama to be more decisive in the Middle East, particularly towards the Syrian conflict, and say lack of a clear American policy has given Islamic State opportunities to expand.

Russian news agency Interfax quoted a military diplomatic source in Moscow as saying the Baghdad coordination centre would be led on a rotating basis by officers of the four countries, starting with Iraq.

The source added a committee might be created in Baghdad to plan military operations and control armed forces units in the fight against Islamic State.

A Russian foreign ministry official told Interfax on Friday that Moscow could "theoretically" join the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State if Damascus were included in international efforts to combat Islamic State and any international military operation in Syria had a United Nations mandate.

Iraqi officials on Friday had denied reports of a coordination cell in Baghdad set up by Russian, Syrian and Iranian military commanders aimed at working with Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias in Iraq.

The armed groups, some of which have fought alongside troops loyal to Assad, are seen as a critical weapon in Baghdad's battle against the radical Sunni militants of Islamic State.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari said in New York on Friday that his country had not received any Russian military advisers to help its forces but called for the U.S.-led coalition to bomb more Islamic State targets in Iraq.

Despite more than $20 billion in U.S. aid and training, Iraq's army has nearly collapsed twice in the last year in the face of advances by Islamic State, which controls large swathes of territory in the north and west of the OPEC oil producer.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/26/uk-mideast-crisis-iraq-russia-idUKKCN0RQ0S420150926

Pues más sobre el tema, que me parece de la mayor importancia (y porque la errática política de los US en la región durante los últimos años, instigada por los elementos neocon de su Departamento de Estado y reflejada en la práctica en la peligrosísima estrategia de explotar "el enemigo de mi enemigo es mi amigo", le ha llevado a quedarse literalmente con las manos atadas):

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-09-27/us-ropes-china-join-russian-military-syria-while-iraq-strikes-intel-deal-moscow-tehr