PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2025

[asustadísimos]

'2026 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY'.—

Acaba de salir la estrategia de Defensa de EE. UU., en desarrollo de la '2026 National Security Strategy'.

Tienen el documento aquí:
https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF

El documento incluye la siguiente imagen:

Emanuel Leutze (1851). Washington cruzando el Delaware. Noche de Navidad de 1776 —hace un cuarto de milenio—. George Washington y su ejército cruzaron el río Delaware durante una brutal tormenta de nieve. Unas horas después, atacaron Trenton y derrotaron a la guarnición. Y cambiaron el rumbo de la guerra.

En 2026, una nueva era 'dorada' (de purpurina) arranca para EE. UU.; y, por tanto, para ti. A la fuerza ahorcan. De la necesidad, virtud. EE. UU. ya no es lo que era. El capitalismo ya no es lo que fue.

En el documento se lee: «Taking our nation from the precipice of a world war just a year ago, President Trump is now leading our nation into a new golden age, one defined by putting Americans first in a commonsense, pragmatic, and concrete way».

En Davos, Trump ha dicho que lo suyo, que según él es una 'dictadura necesaria', es sentido común en un 95%. No lo decía de balde.

Nosotros, en este impagable blog, ya hablamos en su día de qué es el sentido común. En Síntesis:
• 1.º Sentido común: «el agua moja».
• 2.º Ciencia: «el agua es H2O».
• 3.º Filosofía: «el agua es fenoménica».
• 4.º Religión: «el agua es un numen».

En resumen, el nuevo documento de Estrategia Nacional de Defensa 2026 de EE. UU. concreta en su materia el conocido cambio hacia el enfoque unilateral, centrados en sí mismos y en «su» hemisferio occidental asediado económicamente por China. Es lo que se llama el 'Corolario Trump' a una resucitación imposible de la Doctrina Monroe. Conlleva un supuesto hombrenuevismo de derecha: el de los REPATH'H: 'real estate person at heart, hemispheric'.

En relación con Europa, la idea es que EE.UU. quiere soltar lastre: que la 'OTAN europea' asuma la mayor parte de la carga de su propia defensa, de la contención de Rusia —una amenaza «persistente pero manejable»— y del apoyo a Ucrania —«tomar la delantera en el apoyo a la defensa de Ucrania»—.

«La OTAN europea supera ampliamente a Rusia en escala económica, población y, por tanto, poder militar latente», por ello, «nuestros aliados de la OTAN están en una posición sólida para asumir la responsabilidad primaria de la defensa convencional de Europa, con un apoyo crítico pero más limitado de EE.UU.».

Aquí hay lío porque la de Ucrania es una guerra subsidiaria o proxy, cuyo objetivo es contener, sí, pero no a Rusia, sino a la UE. Y la UE no se va a frenar a sí misma con el 'apoyo crítico' estadounidense, ¿crítico? Estamos ante un 'ahí te quedas' que significa la victoria de Rusia.

Se da un vuelco, por tanto, al papel tradicional de EE.UU. como garante de la (in)seguridad europea, dándose prioridad, primero, a la defensa interior de su propio país —la seguridad fronteriza focalizada en la lucha contra la inmigración ilegal—; y, después, a la competencia con China en el Indo-Pacífico, el Índico y el Pacífico, el océano que baña la costa oeste de «su» hemisferio.

¿Qué van a hacer con el Chinatown de San Francisco?

Imágenes de hoy de esta 'defensa interior', del 'homeland', rebosante de 'sentido común', el nada común de los sentidos:

Agentes federales matan a un hombre de 37 años en Mineápolis, dos semanas después de que un agente del «Immigration and Customs Enforcement's» matara a Renee Good.

El 'Corolario Trump' es el Corolario del Calvario 'Popcap'.

A nosotros lo que nos importa es que, en efecto, 2025 ha sido el 'dies ad quem' de la era anterior, la del asqueroso capitalismo popular, con EE. UU. haciendo el canelo, según dicen ellos mismos.

Con lo que no contábamos es que, en la nueva era, iba a tropezar gravemente la llamada 'relación trasatlántica', lo que significa que, a la crisis estructural, se le superpone una gruesa capa de crisis del sistema. Miel sobre hojuelas.

El error está en creer que esto se debe a personajes o élites, y no a leyes objetivas.

Ya no estamos ante la 'pax americana', sino ante el 'fax americano', un flujo a distancia de instrucciones y propaganda unidireccional, soportado por la propiedad de cuotas en nuestros activos productivos, adquirida con dólares que valen la mitad de lo que nos obliga el imperio a pensar que valen. Por cierto, después del 'usexit', ¿cómo los aguamojas van a obligarnos ahora a pensar nada?

La otra cara del 'usexit' es el 'Sell America'.

Gustan de asustarnos con poner aranceles a sus adquisiciones de bienes y servicios, pero no a sus adquisiciones de activos. ¡Vaya con el aguamojismo este de las narices!

El 'Sell America' es lo que viene inmediatamente antes del 'Yankee Go Home'. ¿O no es 'de sentido común'?:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulA4ujWrshk

Como proclamó en Davos el primer ministro canadiense, ya no estamos en la transición de lo viejo a lo nuevo, sino en plena ruptura a la nueva era de capitalismo planificado, en nuestro caso europeo, con fiscos consolidados en comparación con los hemisféricos y con un euro fuerte.

Lo que viene ahora, avisado para este mayo o junio, es el euro digital, en el marco del proceso de desangloidentificación felizmente inaugurado hace un lustro con la bochornosa afrenta de la negociación del 'brexit'.

El Capital (Activo menos Pasivo) es la Renta excedente acumulada. Europa ha demostrado en la historia que, cuando toca, es capaz de poner en su sitio a la distribución de la Renta. Nuestro Capital prevalecerá.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://x.com/rdomenechv/status/2014716812143816827

Humanity will shrink, far sooner than you think
Demography sneaks up on you

The Economist · 2025.09.11

Video: Simon Bailly / Sepia

“In the past”, says Furkan Kayabasoglu, an obstetrician in Istanbul, “I would deliver a couple’s first baby and then their second or even a third.” These days, however, “one and done” parents are becoming the norm. Out of every ten births Mr Kayabasoglu attends, only one is of a second child. “We can’t even reach the number of births needed to train new doctors,” he laments.

Last year Turkey’s total fertility rate (tfr), the number of births a typical woman will have in her lifetime if current patterns persist, fell to 1.48. That is well below the level needed to keep the population stable in the long run, which is about 2.1. It was also below what demographers had expected. The United Nations Population Division thought that Turkey’s tfr would not fall so low until at least the year 2100.

Slumping birthrates are not confined to Turkey. All over the world, in poor and middle-income countries as well as rich ones, fertility is in much sharper decline than most projections had expected.

Chart: The Economist

Alarming as this might sound, it is also more or less inevitable. Many population forecasts, including the un’s, are inflated by implausible assumptions (see chart). Demographers are naturally reluctant to predict that the current pace of decline in fertility rates will continue far into the future, since that would eventually yield a global population of zero. Yet even if you assume that fertility rates will stabilise or recover at some point, it is difficult to justify the choice of any particular year as the moment when that inflection might occur. In the minds of the un’s demographers, the least arbitrary solution to this problem is to assume that the recovery will begin right away.

The un therefore projects that all countries that have transitioned to low fertility will follow one of only two trajectories: a stabilisation or an increase in baby-making. It puts the United States, for example, on the first path. The country’s tfr has fallen almost continuously from 1.9 births in 2010 to 1.6. And there, according to the un, is where it will stay for the rest of the century. On the second trajectory is South Korea, where the fertility rate has plunged from 1.2 to 0.72 over the past dec­ade. The un assumes it will rise slowly back to 1.3 over the next 80 years.
In none of these countries does the un expect fertility rates to continue falling. The improbable implication is that low fertility is a self-correcting problem and that the correction will begin immediately in some of the worst afflicted countries.

It is indeed possible to imagine that fertility might recover in some countries. It has done so before, rising in the early 2000s in the United States and much of northern Europe as women who had delayed having children got round to it. But it is far from clear that the world is destined to follow this example, and anyway, birth rates in most of the places that seemed fecund are declining again. They have fallen by a fifth in Nordic countries since 2010.

John Wilmoth of the United Nations Population Division explains one rationale for the idea that fertility rates will rebound: “an expectation of continuing social progress towards gender equality and women’s empowerment”. If the harm to women’s careers and finances that comes from having children were erased, fertility might rise. But the record of women’s empowerment thus far around the world is that it leads to lower fertility rates. It is not “an air-tight case”, concedes Mr Wilmoth.

Anne Goujon of the iiasa, an institute in Austria that releases rival population projections, calls the expectation of a rebound in fertility “a bit of wishful thinking”. Other demographers question the notion, too. Ms Goujon says that the institute is preparing to include scenarios in which declining fertility persists in the next round of its forecasts.

Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that fertility rates have further to fall in many countries. In India, for instance, fertility varies widely. In Delhi women can expect to have just 1.2 babies. In the poorer northern states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar—together home to about 300m people—the fertility rate is more than double that, but is also falling. In effect, a huge chunk of northern India’s population is tracing the same demographic path as wealthier parts of the country, with a lag of a decade or so. That matters because the national average, now at 1.9, blends regions at different stages of fertility decline. Even if rates stabilise in richer regions, the national rate will continue to fall as poorer places catch up.

A similar logic applies in many other countries, from Colombia to Turkey. If nothing else, the idea that the confluence of social trends that have lowered fertility would reverse all over the world at exactly the same time beggars belief. Yet even short delays make big differences to long-term projections of the world’s population.

Chart: The Economist

To show how sensitive the projected date of the global peak is to these assumptions, The Economist has analysed a few scenarios (see chart). The un expects that in 182 out of 210 countries the annualised change in fertility during the next 75 years will be greater than it has been since 2013. In most of the world, where the tfr has been falling, this means that those declines will either slow down, flatten entirely or start to reverse. In the handful of places where the tfr has been rising, it means that these recent gains would accelerate.

We have maintained this assumption, but have shifted into the future the point at which this abrupt change in the fertility curve occurs. The impact of such a shift is large. We project that if the tfr goes on falling at its recent rate for even one more year, the eventual global population peak will arrive three years sooner, with 130m fewer people. If it declines for another decade before stabilising, peak humanity will arrive in 2065, with 750m fewer people.

“Replacement fertility is a knife-edge,” says Lant Pritchett of the London School of Economics. “Over the very long run, humans shrink to zero or swell to huge numbers, depending on whether they stay below or above the replacement rate.” The assumption that TFR must trend towards replacement is alluring, simply because “It makes the maths embarrassing if you don’t.” Alarmist predictions of a “population bomb”, which were trendy in the 1960s, may have made demographers hesitant to predict the opposite: that humanity will soon be shrinking. And yet, alarming or not, that will soon be happening.

This article appeared in the Briefing section of the print edition under the headline “The era of contraction”

https://www.economist.com/interactive/briefing/2025/09/11/humanity-will-shrink-far-sooner-than-you-think

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2025/09/11/a-contracting-population-need-not-be-a-catastrophe

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

Aitor Maldonado · 2026.01.20 · Comprar un Piso para Vivir es una IDIOT*Z

Saludos.

[tomasjos]

Minnesota desafía a Trump y moviliza a la Guardia Nacional tras la muerte de un hombre a manos de agentes del ICE https://share.google/WBrfsS1mFmGYlDh3K

[CHOSEN]

La UE ya se posicionó.
Aceptó la voladura del NS2, Suiza abandonó su neutralidad por una trifulca fronteriza de un país que "ni siquiera es europeo", y de facto España fue expulsada de Eurovisión para hacerle sitio a Israel en plena oleada sacrificial genocida al dios Baal.




Esas leyes objetivas quizás necesiten un empujoncito.

PD: el ser humano tiene capacidad de obrar.