PPCC. PIsitófilos Creditófagos. Verano 2020

[Maloserá]

...
Los sueldos también son un coste. Su análisis global (sueldos "agregados") nos llevaría a intuir que están planos/descienden.

He ido modificando un poco el texto para explicarme (creo) mejor.

Un saludo a todos los foreros.

Los sueldos están siendo atacados en dos direcciones: el peso menor del agregado salarial en el reparto de rentas (vs rentas de capital e inmobiliarias) y además ha aumentado la desigualdad en el reparto de ese agregado salarial. O sea que los aumentos de productividad que haya habido han hecho que el pastel sea mas grande, pero la porción del pastel de los salarios sigue siendo igual que antes. Porque el capital (y los rentistas) se llevan más. Y de ese pastel salarial (que no crece) un numero cada vez menor de supersueldos se va llevando trocitos cada vez mas grandes.

La demografía en esto deberíá ser favorable e 'igualadora'. Más jubilados, menos trabajadores, sobran casas... El problema es que los jubilados van a ser el principal actor político (por número e intereses comunes) de Europa por lo que nos queda de vida.

Las unicas poblaciones jovenes de verdad que quedan están en Africas y no tiene pinta que Nigeria vaya a ser la nueva China, o Ghana la nueva Corea del Sur.

[Derby]

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-deguindos/ecbs-de-guindos-says-exchange-rate-is-fundamental-for-inflation-idUSKBN2681B4

ECB's de Guindos says exchange rate is fundamental for inflation

The euro’s exchange rate is a “fundamental” determinant of euro zone inflation, European Central Bank vice-president Luis de Guindos said on Thursday, joining a number of ECB policymakers warning about the strength of the single currency.

“The exchange is a fundamental economic variable which affects imports, exports, imported inflation or deflation,” de Guindos said during a webinar.

“A relatively brisk and intense fluctuation in the exchange rate affects inflation expectations and the conditions that determine inflation.”

He added the ECB could not be happy with its own forecast for a 1.3% inflation rate in 2022 but he downplayed fears of deflation.

[berberecho]

La demografía en esto deberíá ser favorable e 'igualadora'. Más jubilados, menos trabajadores, sobran casas... El problema es que los jubilados van a ser el principal actor político (por número e intereses comunes) de Europa por lo que nos queda de vida.

Puede ser. Se me ocurre que, si el Estado necesita kas para pagar pensiones (sí, ya lo sé, eso no tiene que ver con los impuestos y tal... pero es que desagregar los ingresos del Estado es útil para un contable; para nosotros todas las tuberías individuales llegan al mismo estanque, que tiene que tener kas sí o sí, porque tiene otro montón de tuberías que salen). Si necesita para pensiones, decía, y ven que al final no va a quedar más remedio que quitar de sanidad por ejemplo, o de sueldos de funcionarios, o lo que sea, pues a lo mejor a algún Secretario de Estado se le ocurre, aunque sólo sea por salvar el sillón un par de años más (a su jefe tampoco le interesa mucho más) que se podría subir el impuesto a los carburantes. En concreto a la gasolina, que emite gas invernadero (además, coches de gasolina sólo tienen los "ricos"). Esa vaca lechera, dirán, que siempre tiene las ubres a reventar... pero esa subida conforeros, no se la pueden apuntar al BCE.

[Derby]

Todo el artículo es interesante y recoge muchos puntos que se han comentado en este foro. Es largo, así que únicamente destaco unos párrafos. Para mí, lo más destacable de las voces que defienden la condonación de las deudas es la conclusión/premisa de que la cantidad de deuda (pública y privada) es impagable...

https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/its-time-for-a-debt-jubilee

It’s Time for a Debt “Jubilee”

(...) Since 1950, in the top ten economies in the world, there have been no instances where private and public debt to GDP have both declined at least 10 percent within five years. Even when we look at smaller countries, it is very rare.

When all or any portion of the debt to GDP ratio does improve, it is generally due to one of three factors: 1) the “out of one pocket and into the other” trade-off between public and private debt, 2) a calamity, such as very high inflation or recessions and depressions, or 3) high net exports. This last option of high net exports is not feasible, since the United States has never achieved that high a level of exports. The scenario is also controversial because it depends on rising debt in another country that buys the exports. It would require years of sustained austerity. All the while, other countries are also attempting the same strategy, which undermines its effectiveness.

So, we can’t grow our way out of high debt. Can we inflate our way out of it?

It’s routinely claimed that we can, and although deleveraging through inflation is rare, it does sometimes work. But high inflation or hyperinflation is a cure worse than the disease. And there is no guarantee that it will work. During our country’s one recent major bout with inflation, from 1973 to 1982, total debt levels actually increased from 128 percent to 136 percent of GDP.

Furthermore, central banks have shown, over the last decade, that they may not even know how to create inflation. Even though they have employed the methods widely thought to cause high inflation, including low rates, high money supply growth, and massive deficit spending, inflation is running below the central banks’ target. If they struggle to increase or keep inflation at 2 percent, then what makes us think they can increase inflation to 5 percent or 10 percent for several years, the very minimum required to make a meaningful dent in the debt-to-GDP ratio (notwithstanding the temporary food inflation from COVID-based supply disruption)?

Economists have long had a misguided notion that high government debt growth and high money supply growth are the primary causes of inflation, yet there is almost no empirical support for this idea. Looking across all countries since World War II, there have been dozens of sustained periods of very high money supply and government debt growth. Very few were followed by high inflation, and many stretches of high inflation were not preceded by high money supply or high government debt growth.

This notion of inflation caused by money supply or debt is one of the great red herrings of economics. The fact is that, other things being equal, high levels of debt are disinflationary, even deflationary, because they suppress consumption and investment, and thus weaken aggregate demand.

So we cannot look to price inflation to solve the problem of high debt, either.

Finally, the most straightforward proposed solution: Why don’t consumers and businesses just pay down their debt? For two reasons. First, most of them simply can’t. If they had the resources to pay debt down, they wouldn’t have incurred the debt in the first place. But the second reason is more important: If consumers and businesses paid down debt en masse, it would crush the economy. That’s because the dollars used to pay debt down would largely be funded by a reduction in spending. Consumers now have $16.2 trillion in debt. An aggregate paydown of 5 percent of that debt would total $810 billion, and that would almost certainly come from an $810 billion-dollar reduction in spending. Since GDP is a measure of spending, it would bring a 4 percent collapse in GDP. That’s precisely what happened from 1929 to 1933 in the Great Depression, when a collective 20 percent paydown in loans, brought on by banks forcing repayment of loans and borrowers paying down loans, caused GDP to collapse by 45 percent.

We can’t grow our way out of the high private debt problem, we can’t inflate our way out of it, and we can’t pay it down.

So how can we reduce debt?

For private sector debt, the answer is: debt restructuring.

Debt restructuring is a modification of the terms of a loan that deals realistically with a borrower’s ability to pay in times of distress. Typically, the lender reduces the principal balance or the interest rate, or extends the term of the loan.

This action goes by a variety of names, including “debt forgiveness.” Historians sometimes refer to it as “jubilee,” a term used for household debt forgiveness decrees in ancient Israel that were similar to debt forgiveness in ancient Egypt, Babylon, and elsewhere. The widespread existence of this type of debt forgiveness in antiquity profoundly attests to the universality and persistence of this debt accumulation issue. Whether called “restructuring,” “forgiveness,” or “jubilee,” it is the only feasible way to reduce private sector debt when it accumulates to crushing levels in societies, and the only way to do so without severely damaging the economy.

In fact, giving households and small businesses debt relief would be an extraordinary boost to the economy, since it would free money now being used for debt service to be put instead toward investment and spending. Debt forgiveness translates directly into economic renewal and resurgence.

Debt restructuring already occurs routinely within individual lending institutions. Most have individuals or departments dedicated entirely to this type of effort, who work each day to reduce the principal or modify the terms of a given loan based on the borrower’s distress. However, to meaningfully impact debt numbers overall, “jubilee” needs to be implemented on a larger scale.

[siempretarde]

Derby, queria darte un thaks por el articulo, pero es que no se puede dar, sencillamente se hace un  o dos o tres, lo vamos a pasar (transitoriamente) mal, o muy mal, ... A veces tengo problemas para decir "thanks" cuando estoy de acuerdo, pero el objetivo es tan "para abajo"  que hay que escabar en el suelo .... Sencillamente "me siento mal".

https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/10774244/09/20/La-deuda-publica-sube-mas-de-100000-millones-en-lo-que-va-de-2020-y-toca-niveles-no-vistos-en-113-anos.html

La deuda pública sube en más de 100.000 millones en lo que va de 2020 y toca niveles no vistos en 113 años

-El desplome de los ingresos por IRPF, IVA... están generando un gran agujero

-Por otro lado, los gastos del Estado aumentan un 21% por la crisis

-El ajuste deuda/déficit hace que la deuda crezca más rápido todavía

La brecha entre ingresos y gastos ha seguido erosionando las finanzas públicas españolas en julio. Este fuerte desequilibrio suma ya 102.345 millones desde principios de año, lo que ha llevado a la deuda pública a alcanzar niveles que no se veían desde 1907, en términos relativos, tras tocar el 103,68% del PIB. En términos absolutos (euros contantes y sonantes), la deuda está en máximos históricos. Los datos publicados pertenecientes al mes de julio muestran un aumento más leve que el de meses pasados hasta una deuda total de 1,291 billones de euros, frente a los 1,188 billones de diciembre de 2019. De esta forma, la deuda que acumulan las administraciones públicas se aleja cada vez más de los niveles vistos durante y después de la anterior crisis. Ya hay que remontarse más de un siglo atrás para encontrar unos niveles de deuda similares. No obstante, se espera que la deuda siga avanzando durante el año.

La fuerte caída de la actividad a la que se enfrenta España está generando un desplome de los ingresos públicos (desplome de los ingresos por IVA, caída de IRPF, Sociedades...), a la vez que se han disparado los gastos por la activación de los estabilizadores automáticos (prestaciones de paro, Ertes...) y del gasto discrecional para intentar suavizar el golpe. Todo ello coincidirá con un desplome del PIB que dará como resultado a un incremento muy abultado de la deuda pública relativa cuando acabe el año.



Desde el departamento de investigación de CaixaBank explican que este empeoramiento es atribuible, por un lado, a un descenso de los ingresos del Estado en un 15,8% interanual, derivado de la reducción de la actividad por el covid-19. "En particular, la caída del consumo ha mermado la recaudación por IVA un 16,4% interanual (algo más suave que la caída del 18,1% de junio debido posiblemente al repunte del consumo en julio), mientras que la recaudación del IRPF y del Impuesto de Sociedades han caído un 29,4% y un 14,0% respectivamente. Asimismo, los gastos del Estado acumulados hasta julio aumentaron un 21,4% interanual hasta los 156.129 millones de euros. Los mayores aumentos de gasto corresponden a transferencias a las CCAA y a la Seguridad Social".

Así, atendiendo a los datos de déficit público acumulado hasta julio se podía prever que el crecimiento de la deuda iba a ser importante en la primera mitad del año. El déficit del conjunto de las administraciones públicas ascendió al 6,1% del PIB hasta el mes de junio, mientras que el déficit del Estado escala al 5,4% del PIB hasta julio, según los datos del Ministerio de Hacienda. En concreto, en los siete primeros meses del año, el déficit del Estado se sitúa en 60.413 millones, lo que equivale al 5,4% del PIB. Si se deduce el efecto del gasto en intereses (déficit primario), la cifra se sitúa en el 4,2%. Por su parte, el déficit del conjunto de las administraciones públicas, excluidas las corporaciones locales, fue de 68.524 millones hasta junio, lo que equivale al 6,12% del PIB.

Esto deja entrever que el crecimiento de la deuda ha sido muy superior al del déficit, algo que parece carecer de sentido pero no. Todo se debe al conocido como 'ajuste deuda/déficit'. La metodología usada (Protocolo Excesivo de Déficit o PDE) para contabilizar la deuda pública y el déficit son diferentes. Por ejemplo, el rescate de la banca en la anterior crisis o las aportaciones para los rescates de Grecia, Irlanda o Portugal contabilizaron como deuda pero no como déficit, lo que provocó un desajuste similar al actual (algo más pequeño) en el año 2012 que explica aquí a la perfección el Banco de España en una nota técnica.

El Banco de España publicaba ayer miércoles sus estimaciones económicas entre las que se incluían las de déficit público y destacaba el duro golpe que está causando el covid. "El impacto de la crisis sanitaria sobre las finanzas públicas está siendo, asimismo, muy grave. La acción combinada de las contundentes medidas puestas en marcha para contrarrestar el impacto de la pandemia sobre la salud pública y sobre la actividad económica y de los estabilizadores automáticos dará lugar a una fuerte elevación del déficit de las AAPP en 2020, que se situaría en el -10,8% y el -12,1% del PIB.

También, los economistas del BdE calculan que la deuda pública experimentará en 2020 un aumento de hasta 25 puntos porcentuales, pudiendo llegar hasta el 120,6% del PIB. Además, "la ratio continuaría aumentando, en términos acumulados, durante el bienio posterior". Es posible que al final de esta crisis la deuda acabe alcanzando cotas inimaginables hace unos meses. La OCD eleva hasta casi el 130% el aumento de la deuda pública, en parte por la caída del PIB y en parte, probablemente, por el ajuste deuda/déficit del PDE.(...)

[Derby]

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/resbull/2020/html/ecb.rb200917~3bc072ea95.en.html

Why has inflation in the United States been so stable since the 1990s?

(...) The most prominent hypothesis attributes the reduced responsiveness of prices to cost pressures to the increased relevance of global supply chains, heightened international competition, and other effects of globalisation

[siempretarde]

Derby, somos grecia o ddr 2.0 es lo que hay.

Con covid nadie va a rechistar. Quien va a echar la culpa a un virus...

[pedrito]

https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf

FINAL COMMITTEE REPORT THE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT & CERTIFICATION OF THE BOEING 737 MAX

En la pág. 6, último párrafo:

This report was produced by Democratic staff of the Committee and is the culmination of the Committee’s investigative efforts assessing the costs, consequences, and lessons from the design, development, and certification of Boeing’s 737 MAX aircraft. The report reveals several unmistakable facts. The MAX crashes were not the result of a singular failure, technical mistake, or mismanaged event. They were the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA—the pernicious result of regulatory capture on the part of the FAA with respect to its responsibilities to perform robust oversight of Boeing and to ensure the safety of the flying public. The facts laid out in this report document a disturbing pattern of technical miscalculations and troubling management misjudgments made by Boeing. It also illuminates numerous oversight lapses and accountability gaps by the FAA that played a significant role in the 737 MAX crashes.

El informe no tiene desperdicio; merece la pena leerlo entero. Lástima las 248 páginas, y en inglés, y la falta de tiempo que tenemos.

Schedule pressure was visible to all Boeing employees working on the 737 MAX program.

To emphasize the significance of the 737 MAX program’s schedule to Boeing employees, the Committee learned that senior program officials kept a “countdown clock” in their conference room. Keith Leverkuhn, the former Vice President and General Manager of the MAX program, described the clock as an “excitement generator” for Boeing’s staff. But he also acknowledged it was to remind staff about the MAX’s schedule. “One of the mantras that we had was the value of a day,” he said, “ and making sure that we were being prudent with our time, that we were being thorough, but yet, that there was a schedule that needed to be met....”81 He said the countdown clock was used to mark two major milestones: power on, when the MAX was powered up for the first time in the factory, and first flight.

Esto me ha recordado lo que PPC decía hace tiempo; aquello de que la empresa se había convertido en unidades de trabajos forzados para las personas, o algo así.

Pero merece la pena leerlo entero porque evidencia la realidad del "new management".

In June 2018, Ed Pierson, a senior Boeing plant supervisor at the company’s Renton, Washington 737 MAX production factory, emailed Scott Campbell, the 737 General Manager, requesting a meeting about “safety concerns.”86 Mr. Pierson described multiple concerns about production and schedule pressures that were impacting quality control and safety issues. “As a retired Naval Officer and former Squadron Commanding Officer,” wrote Pierson, “I know how dangerous even the smallest of defects can be to the safety of an airplane. Frankly right now all my internal warning bells are going off. And for the first time in my life, I’m sorry to say that I’m hesitant about putting my family on a Boeing airplane.”87In July 2018, five weeks after Mr. Pierson’s email, he finally met with Mr. Campbell in Mr. Campbell’s office. According to Mr. Pierson’s testimony to the Committee, he told Mr. Campbell that in the military they would temporarily halt production if they had the kinds of safety problems that Mr. Pierson was seeing on the MAX factory floor. Mr. Campbell allegedly responded: ‘‘The military is not a profit-making organization.’’88 R ather than heeding Mr. Pierson’s dire warnings and thoroughly evaluating his safety concerns, Boeing continued to ramp up production on the 737 MAX89 and rehired retired Boeing employees to keep the production lines moving at the Renton plant.90 Lion Air flight 610 crashed three months later in October 2018.

[R.G.C.I.M.]

Todo el artículo es interesante y recoge muchos puntos que se han comentado en este foro. Es largo, así que únicamente destaco unos párrafos. Para mí, lo más destacable de las voces que defienden la condonación de las deudas es la conclusión/premisa de que la cantidad de deuda (pública y privada) es impagable...

https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/its-time-for-a-debt-jubilee

It’s Time for a Debt “Jubilee”

(...) Since 1950, in the top ten economies in the world, there have been no instances where private and public debt to GDP have both declined at least 10 percent within five years. Even when we look at smaller countries, it is very rare.

When all or any portion of the debt to GDP ratio does improve, it is generally due to one of three factors: 1) the “out of one pocket and into the other” trade-off between public and private debt, 2) a calamity, such as very high inflation or recessions and depressions, or 3) high net exports. This last option of high net exports is not feasible, since the United States has never achieved that high a level of exports. The scenario is also controversial because it depends on rising debt in another country that buys the exports. It would require years of sustained austerity. All the while, other countries are also attempting the same strategy, which undermines its effectiveness.

So, we can’t grow our way out of high debt. Can we inflate our way out of it?

It’s routinely claimed that we can, and although deleveraging through inflation is rare, it does sometimes work. But high inflation or hyperinflation is a cure worse than the disease. And there is no guarantee that it will work. During our country’s one recent major bout with inflation, from 1973 to 1982, total debt levels actually increased from 128 percent to 136 percent of GDP.

Furthermore, central banks have shown, over the last decade, that they may not even know how to create inflation. Even though they have employed the methods widely thought to cause high inflation, including low rates, high money supply growth, and massive deficit spending, inflation is running below the central banks’ target. If they struggle to increase or keep inflation at 2 percent, then what makes us think they can increase inflation to 5 percent or 10 percent for several years, the very minimum required to make a meaningful dent in the debt-to-GDP ratio (notwithstanding the temporary food inflation from COVID-based supply disruption)?

Economists have long had a misguided notion that high government debt growth and high money supply growth are the primary causes of inflation, yet there is almost no empirical support for this idea. Looking across all countries since World War II, there have been dozens of sustained periods of very high money supply and government debt growth. Very few were followed by high inflation, and many stretches of high inflation were not preceded by high money supply or high government debt growth.

This notion of inflation caused by money supply or debt is one of the great red herrings of economics. The fact is that, other things being equal, high levels of debt are disinflationary, even deflationary, because they suppress consumption and investment, and thus weaken aggregate demand.

So we cannot look to price inflation to solve the problem of high debt, either.

Finally, the most straightforward proposed solution: Why don’t consumers and businesses just pay down their debt? For two reasons. First, most of them simply can’t. If they had the resources to pay debt down, they wouldn’t have incurred the debt in the first place. But the second reason is more important: If consumers and businesses paid down debt en masse, it would crush the economy. That’s because the dollars used to pay debt down would largely be funded by a reduction in spending. Consumers now have $16.2 trillion in debt. An aggregate paydown of 5 percent of that debt would total $810 billion, and that would almost certainly come from an $810 billion-dollar reduction in spending. Since GDP is a measure of spending, it would bring a 4 percent collapse in GDP. That’s precisely what happened from 1929 to 1933 in the Great Depression, when a collective 20 percent paydown in loans, brought on by banks forcing repayment of loans and borrowers paying down loans, caused GDP to collapse by 45 percent.

We can’t grow our way out of the high private debt problem, we can’t inflate our way out of it, and we can’t pay it down.

So how can we reduce debt?

For private sector debt, the answer is: debt restructuring.

Debt restructuring is a modification of the terms of a loan that deals realistically with a borrower’s ability to pay in times of distress. Typically, the lender reduces the principal balance or the interest rate, or extends the term of the loan.

This action goes by a variety of names, including “debt forgiveness.” Historians sometimes refer to it as “jubilee,” a term used for household debt forgiveness decrees in ancient Israel that were similar to debt forgiveness in ancient Egypt, Babylon, and elsewhere. The widespread existence of this type of debt forgiveness in antiquity profoundly attests to the universality and persistence of this debt accumulation issue. Whether called “restructuring,” “forgiveness,” or “jubilee,” it is the only feasible way to reduce private sector debt when it accumulates to crushing levels in societies, and the only way to do so without severely damaging the economy.

In fact, giving households and small businesses debt relief would be an extraordinary boost to the economy, since it would free money now being used for debt service to be put instead toward investment and spending. Debt forgiveness translates directly into economic renewal and resurgence.

Debt restructuring already occurs routinely within individual lending institutions. Most have individuals or departments dedicated entirely to this type of effort, who work each day to reduce the principal or modify the terms of a given loan based on the borrower’s distress. However, to meaningfully impact debt numbers overall, “jubilee” needs to be implemented on a larger scale.

Ese run run de deuda perpetua...
Qué desazón!

[errozate]

GOIRIGOLZARRI el SÍSIFO de la BANKA

Un artículo sobre el personaje de la semana en aquel 2012, un poco delirante, pero, bueno, ahí va:

https://www.elperiodico.com/es/gente/20120604/harrijasotzaile-el-sisifo-de-la-banca-1877062

[Derby]

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/billionaire-investor-ray-dalio-on-capitalisms-crisis-the-world-is-going-to-change-in-shocking-ways-in-the-next-five-years-2020-09-17

Billionaire investor Ray Dalio on capitalism’s crisis: The world is going to change ‘in shocking ways’ in the next five years

Veteran hedge-fund manager says capitalists don’t divide the economic pie well, so the system isn’t working effectively for all

(...) The United States’ relative position in the world, which was dominant in almost all these categories at the beginning of this world order in 1945, has declined and is exhibiting real signs that should raise worries. There’s a lot of baggage. The U.S. has a lot of debt, which is adding to the hurdles that typically drag an economy down, so in order to succeed, you have to do a pretty big debt restructuring. History shows what kind of a challenge that is.

I just want to present understanding and facts. There’s a life cycle. You’re born and you die. As you get older you can see certain things that are symptoms of being later on in life. To know the life cycle and to know that these symptoms are emerging is what I’m trying to convey. The United States is a 75-year-old empire and it is exhibiting signs of decline. If you want to extend your life, there are clear things you can do, but it means doing things that you don’t want to do.

(...) We now have too much emphasis on distributing wealth and getting it from producing debt and printing money, and not enough from increasing productivity. Wealth cannot be created by creating debt and money. We have to be productive together, so we have to look at the good investments that we can make together that make total sense, like in education, and create equal opportunity in order to be productive.

We have to be in this together. The system needs to be reengineered to do this. But if we don’t do this engineering well, we’re going to spend in an unlimited way and deal with that by creating debt that won’t ever be paid back, and we will risk losing the reserve currency status of the dollar. If we get into that position — and we’re very close — things will get much worse because we are living on borrowed money that’s financing our consumption.

(...) The world is going to change in the next five years in shocking ways in relation to the three big issues we have been talking about.

First, there’s a debt-money cycle — what is the value of money? What will happen to the debt? Will the dollar retain its value? The finances of this — who is going to pay for it? How? What will work? That’s number one.

Second, the wealth, opportunity and values gaps will have to be dealt with. Are we going to be at each other’s throats in a way that is harmful or are we going to be working together even if things get worse?

Third is the rising of a great power in China to challenge the existing power of the United States. Will this be well handled?

We will be dealing with these issues in the next presidential term, which will have a huge effect on our outcomes. The last time those three things existed as they do now was the 1930 to 1945 period. That’s the last time you had zero interest rates and money printing. That’s the last time you had the wealth and political gaps as large as they are today, and it was the last time you had rising powers challenging the existing world order. This and many analogous times before it help to give us perspective.

[pollo]

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/billionaire-investor-ray-dalio-on-capitalisms-crisis-the-world-is-going-to-change-in-shocking-ways-in-the-next-five-years-2020-09-17

Billionaire investor Ray Dalio on capitalism’s crisis: The world is going to change ‘in shocking ways’ in the next five years

Veteran hedge-fund manager says capitalists don’t divide the economic pie well, so the system isn’t working effectively for all

(...) The United States’ relative position in the world, which was dominant in almost all these categories at the beginning of this world order in 1945, has declined and is exhibiting real signs that should raise worries. There’s a lot of baggage. The U.S. has a lot of debt, which is adding to the hurdles that typically drag an economy down, so in order to succeed, you have to do a pretty big debt restructuring. History shows what kind of a challenge that is.

I just want to present understanding and facts. There’s a life cycle. You’re born and you die. As you get older you can see certain things that are symptoms of being later on in life. To know the life cycle and to know that these symptoms are emerging is what I’m trying to convey. The United States is a 75-year-old empire and it is exhibiting signs of decline. If you want to extend your life, there are clear things you can do, but it means doing things that you don’t want to do.

(...) We now have too much emphasis on distributing wealth and getting it from producing debt and printing money, and not enough from increasing productivity. Wealth cannot be created by creating debt and money. We have to be productive together, so we have to look at the good investments that we can make together that make total sense, like in education, and create equal opportunity in order to be productive.

We have to be in this together. The system needs to be reengineered to do this. But if we don’t do this engineering well, we’re going to spend in an unlimited way and deal with that by creating debt that won’t ever be paid back, and we will risk losing the reserve currency status of the dollar. If we get into that position — and we’re very close — things will get much worse because we are living on borrowed money that’s financing our consumption.

(...) The world is going to change in the next five years in shocking ways in relation to the three big issues we have been talking about.

First, there’s a debt-money cycle — what is the value of money? What will happen to the debt? Will the dollar retain its value? The finances of this — who is going to pay for it? How? What will work? That’s number one.

Second, the wealth, opportunity and values gaps will have to be dealt with. Are we going to be at each other’s throats in a way that is harmful or are we going to be working together even if things get worse?

Third is the rising of a great power in China to challenge the existing power of the United States. Will this be well handled?

We will be dealing with these issues in the next presidential term, which will have a huge effect on our outcomes. The last time those three things existed as they do now was the 1930 to 1945 period. That’s the last time you had zero interest rates and money printing. That’s the last time you had the wealth and political gaps as large as they are today, and it was the last time you had rising powers challenging the existing world order. This and many analogous times before it help to give us perspective.

Ya no hay forma de esconderlo. ¿Fuertes elementos de planificación central?. En EE.UU.
Hace dos años nos lo dicen y nos partimos la caja.

[JoaquinR]

Principles by Ray Dalio

El Dalio está publicando un libro interesante, capítulo a capítulo, en el que habla de los ciclos de los imperios centrándose en las historias de USA, China, Holanda e Inglaterra. Es muy curioso, porque por lo visto este señor se ha codeado con gente como Lee Kuan Yew de Singapur, el traductor de Deng Xiaoping, asesoró al equipo que montó la bolsa en China y cosas así, así que tiene mucho que decir acerca del progreso de China visto en primera persona. Tiene sesgos fuertes, pero es lectura recomendada.

[Derby]

https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2020/09/17/economia/1600339304_627938.html

La Comisión identifica siete áreas de actuación para que los socios inviertan los fondos europeos

La Comisión Europea ha pedido este jueves a los Estados miembros que destinen las ayudas del fondo de recuperación a un total de siete áreas que el Ejecutivo Comunitario ha identificado para una correcta absorción del dinero, a fin de asegurar la reconstrucción económica a corto plazo y garantizar un crecimiento sostenido en el futuro. Bruselas se centra en impulsar las energías renovables, la eficiencia energética en edificios, el transporte limpio, el despliegue de banda ancha de internet, la ampliación de la nube, la modernización de las Administraciones públicas y la actualización de los sistemas educativos nacionales.

Pese a estas directrices, las capitales deberán respetar también las recomendaciones económicas que Bruselas les hace cada año, en particular las de 2019 y 2020, centradas principalmente en el Pacto Verde y en el crecimiento sostenible. Es vital, explica la Comisión, que los Estados miembros impulsen "la capacidad de absorción de fondos de la UE a nivel nacional". España, sin ir más lejos, solo ejecutó el 35% de los fondos que tenía reservados para el periodo 2014-2020. Esta vez, únicamente en 2021 y 2022, recibirá unos 43.000 millones de euros en transferencias a fondo perdido.

Las recomendaciones particulares para cada país se incluyen en el Semestre Europeo. Pero en términos generales, la Comisión se centra en siete ámbitos en los que insta que se invierta el dinero. En lo relativo a la transición verde, uno de los pilares del fondo, pide el desarrollo de tecnologías limpias "preparadas para el futuro" y la aceleración del desarrollo y uso de energías renovables. También insiste en la renovación y rehabilitación del parque de edificios, tanto públicos como privados. A su vez, recomienda promover las tecnologías limpias en el transporte y la movilidad, con estaciones de carga y repostaje que también se extiendan al transporte público.

En lo que atañe a la digitalización, la Comisión propone otros tres ámbitos de actuación: por un lado, el despliegue de servicios de banda ancha rápidos en todas las regiones y hogares, incluidas las redes de fibra y 5G. Por otro, la digitalización de la administración y los servicios públicos, incluidos los sistemas judicial y sanitario, y el aumento de las capacidades de la nube de datos industriales europeos, así como el desarrollo de los procesadores más potentes, de vanguardia y sostenibles.

Por último, Bruselas pide adaptar y actualizar los sistemas educativos nacionales para apoyar las competencias digitales y la formación educativa y profesional para todas las edades.(...)

[Derby]

La editorial de El Pais:

https://elpais.com/opinion/2020-09-17/sin-aliento.html

Sin aliento

La recuperación económica será más lenta y exigirá prorrogar el gasto social

Las previsiones del Banco de España sobre los efectos económicos de la pandemia coinciden, en lo sustancial, con las advertencias que, menos detalladas, pero con igual preocupación, ha difundido la OCDE: la recuperación de la economía va a ser más lenta y difícil de lo esperado; también más desigual, según zonas geográficas y sectores. La recuperación esperada tras el arranque de la actividad económica en España se está ralentizando de forma apreciable, como consecuencia de la recaída del turismo (por el efecto fatal de los rebrotes). Las dudas mandan en el escenario económico y en el estadístico. La pandemia no está controlada y las economías penden de nuevas oleadas de covid-19 y de las dificultades sanitarias y sociales para afrontarlas. No es casual que el Banco de España ofrezca una horquilla en sus previsiones del PIB (entre -10,5% y -12,6% para este año, en lugar de un pronóstico nítido, con un empeoramiento de un punto sobre las previsiones anteriores), un aumento del paro que puede llegar al 22,1% el año próximo y un desbordamiento de la deuda que puede alcanzar el 128% del PIB.

La pérdida de aliento de la reactivación cambia significativamente el escenario de política económica. Con una recuperación más lenta, el Gobierno se enfrenta a la necesidad de prolongar las ayudas sociales y demorar la cancelación de los ERTE para conjurar un crecimiento descontrolado del paro. Por el momento, esta fórmula de regulación laboral tiene que mantenerse hasta finales de diciembre, en función de cómo evolucione la pandemia, quizá también durante el primer trimestre del año. Una salvedad obligada: quizá en 2021 la aplicación de expedientes temporales tenga que ser limitada sectorialmente; y, por otra parte, este modelo de regulación no puede convertirse en permanente. La protección laboral requiere una reflexión más profunda, no acuciada por las urgencias, que mitigue los efectos de la crisis sobre la ocupación y sobre las rentas salariales.

Pero la ralentización de la fase de recuperación de la economía agudiza además la urgencia de elaborar y acordar un plan de reactivación a tres años que incluya, como condiciones obligadas, una estrategia de estabilización financiera que cubra ese periodo como mínimo —una deuda del 128% del PIB es insostenible a medio plazo y en todo caso convierte a la economía española en un blanco fácil en caso de una nueva crisis global—, compromisos de inversión pactados y una garantía de que habrá Presupuestos ajustados a las necesidades de cada ejercicio. Las fuerzas políticas que bloqueen las cuentas públicas anuales incurrirán en una grave responsabilidad ante los ciudadanos; y por más que esas responsabilidades no se exijan a corto plazo, acabarán por pasar factura.

No conviene malinterpretar el papel de los fondos europeos. Permitirán salvar sin problemas de déficit los próximos Presupuestos y quizá mitiguen el evidente retraso de la recuperación española respecto de otros países europeos; pero dejan sin resolver la debilidad estructural de las finanzas públicas. España tiene que dotarse de una estructura firme de ingresos fiscales con el doble objetivo de permitir al Estado una intervención social en casos de derrumbamiento económico (como el presente) y corregir de una vez para siempre la incapacidad para reducir el déficit estructural, que distorsiona la reducción de la deuda. Esa obligación tiene un nombre: reforma fiscal.